Archive for November, 2008

Tort Immunity Applies to ‘Manmade Objects’ on Recreational Hiking and Riding Trails

Wednesday, November 26th, 2008

An Illinois appellate court recently held that the Forest Preserve District of Lake County was immune, pursuant to Section 3-107(b) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-07(b)), in a personal injury lawsuit arising out of injuries sustained on a wooden bridge located on a recreational bike path.  McElroy v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Lake County, 2008 WL 3854986 (2d Dist. Aug. 19, 2008).

On September 6, 2008, the plaintiff rode his bicycle in the Rollins Savanna Forest Preserve and followed a marked gravel bike path that led to an elevated wooden bridge.  The plaintiff was injured when his bicycle dropped off the western portion of the bridge, which did not have a ramp at the other end and was not connected to the trail.  The bridge had been damaged due to flooding and had not yet been repaired.

The plaintiff, and his wife, filed a complaint alleging negligence and willful and wanton conduct.  The trial court dismissed the count alleging negligence, but denied summary judgment on the willful and wanton counts under the Tort Immunity Act.  The trial court ruled that section 3-107(b) did not apply because the manmade wooden bridge was not a trail.  The appellate court disagreed.

Section 3-107 of the Tort Immunity Act states:

“Neither a local public entity or a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a condition of:  (a) Any road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas . . . (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.”  745 ILCS 10/3-107 (West 2004) (emphasis added).

The appellate court addressed the question of whether the wooden bridge from which the plaintiff fell was part of a “hiking” or “riding” “trail,” which would provide defendant immunity from liability.

The appellate court rejected an earlier Illinois appellate court decision, Goodwin v. Carbondale Park Dist., 268 Ill. app. 3d 489 (1994), in which the court held that section 3-107(b) gave governmenmtal entities absolute immunity from injuries sustained on “unimproved” trails only.  In McElroy, the court explicitly “disagreed with Goodwin‘s contention that a trail must be ‘unimproved’ in order to fall under section 3-107(b).”

Instead, the court accepted the defendant’s argument that “regardless of whether a trail surface is crushed gravel, asphalt, or wooden planks, section 3-107(b) applies to multi-use trails, immunizing it from liability for any condition of the trail.”  Thus, although the bridge was manmade and the bridge’s defects caused the plaintiff’s injuries, the defendants were still immune from any liability under the Tort Immunity Act.

Illinois personal injury lawyers will continue to fight on behalf of injured plaintiffs to compensate them for the harm caused by the negligence of others, including governmental entities.

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Hospital’s Institutional Negligence

Tuesday, November 25th, 2008

An Illinois Appellate Court, in Longnecker v. Loyola University Medical Center, recently reversed a trial court’s order and reinstated a $2.7 million jury verdict against Loyola University Medical Center.  The plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, Carl Longnecker, filed a Chicago medical negligence lawsuit against Dr. Sirish Parvathaneni and Loyola Medical Center, after Mr. Longnecker died following an unsuccessful heart transplant, in which he received a diseased “hypertrophic heart.”

Although the jury fond in favor of Dr. Parvathaneni and Loyola on the professional negligence claim, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her theory that Loyola committed “institutional negligence” by failing to ensure that Dr. Parvathaneni understood his role as a procuring surgeon.  It awarded the plaintiff $2.7 million.

After trial, the trial court found the verdict in favor of Dr. Parvathaneni to be “irreconcilable” with the verdict against Loyola, and therefore vacated the verdict against Loyola, leaving the plaintiff with nothing.  The Appellate Court reversed.

In medical malpractice cases, a hospital may face liability under two separate and distinct theories:  (1) vicarious liability for the medical negligence of its agents or employees; and (2) liability for its own institutional negligence.  In a professional negligence case, the standard of care requires the defendant to act with the same degree of knowledge, skill and ability as an ordinarily careful professional would exercise under similar circumstances.

“Institutional negligence” involves an analogous standard of care; a defendant hospital is judged against what a reasonably careful hospital would do under the same circumstances.  Unlike typical medical malpractice cases, the institutional negligence of hospitals can be determined without expert testimony in some cases.

In an institutional negligence case, a hospital owes a duty to its patients to exercise reasonable care in light of apparent risk.  In Longnecker, the “apparent risk” was that a donor heart with significant hypertrophy would be accepted for transplantation.  In order to avoid this risk, Loyola had a duty to ensure that each member of the heart transplant team was fully aware of his role in evaluating the donor heart for transplantation.

However, according to the plaintiff, Dr. Parvathaneni was not informed of his role to evaluate the donor heart after harvesting, not simply examining the heart while in the donor.  Had he performed a physical examination of the donor heart after the heart was removed, he would have found “significant hypertrophy” of the heart.  The Court found that the jury was free to draw the conclusion that the transplant surgeon would not have implanted that heart had he known of the hypertrophy.

The Court held the verdicts were not inconsistent, reversed the order of the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings — meaning that the plaintiff should have her $2.7 million jury verdict reinstated.

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Recent Illinois Decision Regarding the Collateral Source Rule

Tuesday, November 25th, 2008

dsc 0021 240x300 Recent Illinois Decision Regarding the Collateral Source Rule

Matthew A. Passen, attorney for the top-ranked Chicago Personal Injury law firm of Passen Law Group, recently published an article in the Chicago Bar Association’s CBA Record magazine titled, “Illinois Supreme Court Expands Scope of the Collateral Source Rule.”  Mr. Passen discusses the recent Supreme Court decision, Wills v. Foster, in which the Court answered a number of previously unanswered questions regarding the Rule’s scope and application.

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