Archive for December, 2008

Zero Damages for Disability and Loss of Normal Life Not Inconsistent With Positive Jury Award for Medical Expenses and Pain and Suffering

Tuesday, December 30th, 2008

Proving damages sustained by injured plaintiffs and their family members is one of the most important skills required of experienced personal injury attorneys in Chicago and Illinois as a whole.  Successful personal injury trial lawyers must be able to communicate persuasively to a jury support for each element of damages available under Illinois law in personal injury actions.

In Poliszczuk v. Winkler, No. 1-07-0490 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Dec. 1, 2008), the plaintiffs (two minor siblings) brought a personal injury action arising out a motor vehicle accident in which their vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendant.   The defendant admitted negligence prior to trial, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on the issue of causation and damages.

The jury rendered verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them modest damages — namely, $39,100 collectively for “past and future medical expenses” and “past and future pain and suffering.”  However, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $0 for past and future “disability” and “loss of a normal life.”

In plaintiffs’ post-trial motion and on appeal, they argued that the jury’s verdicts were “against the manifest weight of the evidence” and were “internally inconsistent” and inadequate.  The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and the appellate court affirmed.

First, the court held that while it was error for the jury to have been instructed on both “disability” and “loss of normal life” because, as “instruction IPI Civil (2000) No. 30.04.01 makes clear, it is either one or the other.”  However, the court found no prejudice to the defendant because the jury returned verdicts of $0 for both disability and loss of normal life.

Second, the court held that the jury verdicts were not internally inconsistent or inadequate.  The court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Snover v. McGraw, 172 Ill. 2d 438 (1996), rejected the previous rule that an award for medical expenses without an award for pain and suffering and/or disability required reversal per se.  Instead, the Court “held that a jury may award pain-related medical expenses and, at the same time, may also determine that the evidence of pain and suffering was insufficient to support a further monetary award.  Snover, 172 Ill. 2d at 448.

The court may overturn a jury award “only if the jury ignored an element of damages, acted out of passion or prejudice, or made an award not reasonably related to loss.”  Snover, 172 Ill. 2d at 447.  According to the court, the fact that the jury chose to award no money for disability and for loss of normal life, while awarding money for medical expenses and pain and suffering “is not proof, by itself, that the jury ‘ignored’ that element.”  Second, plaintiffs were not claiming that the jury acted out of passion or prejudice.

Thus, the issue was whether the jury verdicts were “reasonably related” to the loss suffered by the plaintiffs. The court noted that disability and loss of normal life are “separate and distinct from either past and future medical expenses or pain and suffering.”

Further, unlike economic damages, “disability or loss or normal life award is ‘not as readily calculable in money and jurors must draw on their real life experience in making an award.”  The court held that the evidence in the record supported the jury award of $0 damages for disability and loss of normal life.  Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ post-trial motions.

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City Liable For Willful and Wanton Conduct in Releasing Drunken Teenager Leading to Wrongful Death

Tuesday, December 30th, 2008

The Illinois appellate court for the Fifth District recently held that a plaintiff’s personal injury law firm may proceed with its action against the City of Herrin arising out of the death of Chelsea Keene on August 9, 2003, as she walked along a public street in Herrin, Illinois.  Keener v. City of Herrin, No. 5-06-0501, 2008 WL 4491390 (5th Dist. Oct 6, 2008).  Chelsea’s mother, Jennifer, filed a five-count complaint against the City of Herrin alleging that Herrin was responsible for Chelsea’s death under theories of negligence and willful and wanton conduct.

Jennifer alleged that on the evening of August 8, 2003, through the morning hours of August 9, 2003, Chelsea, who was 18 years old, consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication.  At approximately 3:30 a.m., officers for the Herrin police department arrested Chelsea for underage drinking.

Jennifer alleged that when Herrin police officers took Chelsea into custody, Chelsea was incoherent and legally intoxicated with a  blood-alcohol level of 0.18.  Nevertheless, at approximately 4:40 a.m., the Herrin police department released Chelsea from the police station unattended, without any assistance, and while she was still intoxicated.  At approximately 5 a.m., a vehicle struck and killed Chelsea as she walked on a street in Herrin.

The trial court held that the defendant city was immune from suit pursuant to sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/4-102, 4-107 (West 2006)), and dismissed the complaint accordingly.  On appeal, the Fifth District held that the trial court correctly dismissed the counts alleging negligence, but erred in dismissing the counts that alleged willful and wanton conduct.

Section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act provides, in part, “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable . . . if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service . . .”  Section 4-107 provides that the public entity is not liable “for an injury caused by the failure to make an arrest or by releasing a person in custody.”  Both sections provide for “absolute immunity.”

However, section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act limits absolute immunity under certain circumstances, including willful and wanton conduct.  Specifically, section 2-202 provides, “A public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct.”

In Keener, the appellate court held that Jennifer’s claim sufficiently alleged willful and wanton conduct on the part of the Herrin police officers in executing or enforcing the law to fall within section 2-202′s exception to absolute immunity.  The court cited two analogous cases, Fatigato v. Village of Olympia Fields, 281 Ill. App. 3d 347 (1996) and Ozik v. Gramins, 345 Ill. App. 3d 502 (2003), in which the courts held that the government could be held liable pursuant to section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act for releasing a drunk driver who subsequently was injured in a car accident.

Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred in granting Herrin’s motion to dismiss the counts alleging that Chelesa’s death resulted from Herrin’s willful and wanton conduct.  The court held that the City of Herrin is “not entitled to blanket immunity with respect to those counts, and we remand for a jury to determine the issues raised in those claims.”

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Answering Requests To Admit Facts In Illinois

Tuesday, December 23rd, 2008

Qualified Chicago personal injury lawyers often engage in years of discovery before a case is settled or goes to trial.  One of the most important tools of discovery available to personal injury attorneys in Illinois are requests for the admission of facts (“requests to admit”).  Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216.

This is especially true after Szczeblewski v. Gossett, 342 Ill. App. 3d 344 (5th Dist. 2003), in which the Illinois appellate court strengthened the force of requests to admit.  Szczeblewski involved a personal injury action arising out of a rear-end collision.

Plaintiffs filed requests to admit pertaining to medical services and bills.  Specifically, plaintiffs requested the defendant to admit that “the attached bill . . . represents charges for services which were reasonable and necessary treatment . . . as a result of the [collision]” and also that “the charges on the attached bill . . . are fair and reasonable charges for the services performed.”

In response to the requests to admit, the defendnat stated that he “can neither admit or deny . . . in that it requires him to give a medical opinion which he is not qualified to do.”  Plaintiff moved to compel answers to the requests.

The appellate court noted that the Supreme Court in P.R.S. Int’l, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224 (1998) held that Rule 216 allows requests for the admission of “any specified relevant fact.”  Therefore, the “key question is whether a requested admission deals with a question of fact.”

Therefore, the Szczeblewski court first held that a “defendant’s conduct as the cause of the occurrence, the necessity and reasonableness of the medical services a plaintiff received to treat his or her injuries, and the reasonable cost of the medical services received are all facts that are proper subjects for a Rule 216 request to admit.”  342 Ill. App. 3d at 348.

Furthermore, the court noted that the “purpose” of a request to admit is “not to discover facts but, rather, to establish some of the material facts in a case without the necessity of formal proof at trial.”  Therefore, the court held that a party must “make a reasonable effort to secure answers to requests to admit from persons and documents within the responding party’s control . . . [including] the defendant’s attorney and insurance company investigators or representatives.”

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