Archive for January, 2009

Oncologist Expert Held Unqualified to Testify Against Surgeon

Monday, January 26th, 2009

The First District Illinois Appellate Court held that an oncologist was not qualified to testify as an expert witness against a surgeon accused of failing to diagnose a patient’s lymphoma.  Carol and Robert McWilliams v. Donald Dettore, et al., No. 1-07-0678.  This case highlights the importance of Chicago Medical Malpractice Attorneys selecting the most qualified expert within the appropriate medical field of specialty to use as expert witnesses in Illinois medical malpractice cases.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Christopher Joyce, a surgeon, for failing to diagnose non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.  The plaintiff retained Dr. Hector Gomez, a hematologist/oncologist, to testify that Joyce violated the standard of care when he chose not to perform a biopsy on Carol McWilliam’s swollen lymphnodes.

McWilliams was later diagnosed with stage IV lymphoma, which cannot be cured.  The plaintiff argued that her lymphoma would have been curable if caught sooner.

The court granted the defendant’s motion in limine to bar Dr. Gomez from testifying as an expert witness.  The court held that Gomez was not qualified because he had no experience with the decision-making process used by surgeons in deciding whether to perform a biopsy.  According to the court, “before a plaintiff’s expert may step into the shoes of a defendant doctor to assess his medical skills, the plaintiff’s expert must demonstrate he is familiar with the medical standard against which the defendant doctor’s medical judgment must be measured.”

The court conceded that, in certain circumstances, an oncologist might be qualified to testify against a surgeon.  “While it is not beyond the realm of possibility that an oncologist may be capable of criticizing a surgeon’s decision to forego a biopsy, Dr. Gomez’s testimony did not demonstrate the necessary expertise.”

A further point of interest for practicing Chicago Medical Negligence Lawyers is the court’s application of de novo review, as opposed an abuse of discretion standard.

This case stresses the importance of selecting the right medical expert witness(es) early in the investigation stage, before the medical malpractice lawsuit is even filed.  Here, after the court granted the defendant’s motion in limine, the plaintiffs sought to voluntarily dismiss their case (and re-file at a later date).  However, the court refused because the jury had already been sworn.

Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s medical malpractice lawsuit with prejudice.  This means the plaintiff can never have her day in court, all because her attorney chose the wrong expert.

share save 171 16 Oncologist Expert Held Unqualified to Testify Against Surgeon

Contractor Liability in Construction Accident Cases

Friday, January 23rd, 2009

Competent Chicago construction site accident lawyers must stay abreast of Illinois law concerning general contractor liability.  An Illinois appellate court held that a general contractor owed a duty of care to an ironworker employed by a subcontractor who injured his back while unloading bolts at a Chicago condominium development because the contractor retained sufficient control over the use of the crane on the construction site.  Garcia v. Wooton Construction, Ltd., No. 1-07-1883 (1st Dist. Dec. 29, 2008).

In August 2002, a condominium complex known as “Kingsbury on the Park” in Chicago, Illinois was being developed.  The plaintiff, an ironworking apprentice for a subcontractor, was in the process of unloading a crane basket containing approximately 10 kegs of bolts, each keg weighing between 100 and 200 pounds.  As the plaintiff was handing the kegs to another ironworker, he felt something “pop” in his back and he experienced severe pain.

The plaintiff was eventually diagnosed with a herniated disc, and underwent surgery to repair the herniated disc.  Less than two years later, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the owner and general contractor at the construction site.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant, general contractor, was negligent in (1) failing to provide a crane or other mechanical devce to move the kegs of bolts and (2) permitting the plaintiff to move the kegs manually where they knew or should have known a crane or other device was necessary.

The general contractor filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because it did not retain control over the plaintiff’s work under section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  The general contractor also argued that the plaintiff could not establish proximate causation.  The trial court granted the general contractor’s motion for summary judgment.

The appellate court reversed, finding that the general contractor “retained control”.  Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that “one who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.”

The court found that the general contractor had ultimate authority over the use of the only crane on the job site.  Therefore, the general contractor “had a duty of care to reasonably exercise its control over the use of the crane so as not to expose the [plaintiff] to foreseeable danger of harm.”

Furthermore, the court found that two other questions were for the jury to decide:  (1)  whether the general contractor breached its duty of care; and (2) whether the general contractor’s actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

share save 171 16 Contractor Liability in Construction Accident Cases

Metra Not Immune From Train Accident Lawsuits

Wednesday, January 21st, 2009

Chicago train accident lawyers - Passen Law Group

In a win for Chicago train accident lawyers and their injured clients, Illinois circuit court recently held that the Illinois Tort Immunity Act does not apply to a common carrier such as the metropolitan commuter railroad system (“Metra”).  The court ruled Metra was not shielded by the Tort Immunity Act in a personal injury lawsuit filed by a woman who was injured while aboard a Metra train.  Sylvia Ortiz-Rivera v. Northeast Ill. Regional Commuter Railroad Corp. d/b/a/ Metra., No. 07 M5 2363.

The plaintiff was injured while aboard Metra’s southwest line departing from Union Station.  Trains were delayed that day because of a snow storm.  While moving from one coach car to another, the plaintiff opened an interior door and than the door closed quickly on her hand, breaking her fingers.  Metra filed a motion to dismiss stating that the Tort Immunity Act immunized it from injuries that occur due to weather.

Judge Janet Adams Brosnahan found that the “clear” language of the Tort Immunity Act is states that “immunity does not attach — to any public entity that is operating as a common carrier.” Accordingly, the judge granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike Metra’s first affirmative defense based upon the Tort Immunity Act, and the plaintiff was able to proceed in her personal injury lawsuit against Metra.

share save 171 16 Metra Not Immune From Train Accident Lawsuits