Archive for June, 2009

Client, Not Attorney, Must Sign Response to Request to Admit, Even if Client Cannot be Located

Wednesday, June 17th, 2009

request to admit Illinois 300x225 Client, Not Attorney, Must Sign Response to Request to Admit, Even if Client Cannot be LocatedChicago personal injury lawyers occasionally represent difficult clients, including those that are sometimes difficult to locate. The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District recently decided a case that stresses the importance of effective, timely communication between the client and his or her personal injury lawyer.

In Brookbank v. Olson, No. 1-08-1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. April 8, 2009), the plaintiff brought a personal injury negligence lawsuit arising out of a car accident. The plaintiff issued a Request to Admit Facts pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 216(c), which sought admission from the defendant that: (1) an attached exhibit was a true and accurate statement of the plaintiff’s medical expenses; (2) the charges were fair, reasonable and customary charges for the medical services performed; and (3) the charges were related to the injuries suffered as a result of the accident. The defense counsel objected to the requests to admit, and stated that he was “unable to contact [d]efendant to determine the veracity of any admission or denial.” Defense counsel was also unable to produce his client for a deposition. Defense counsel then signed and verified the responses in defendant’s absence, denying the matters of which admission was requested.

The trial court certified the following question of law for consideration by the appellate court: “Whether the trial court has authority to allow only a party’s attorney to sign and verify a response to a Rule 216 request to admit facts, when the attorney cannot locate the party, i.e., his client.” The appellate court held that the Chicago car accident lawyer cannot sign and verify a response to a Request to Admit Facts, even when he cannot locate his client.

The appellate court stated that Rule 216(c), as well as supporting Illinois case law, including Moy v. Ng, 341 Ill. App. 3d 984 (2003) and Vision Point of Sale Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334 (2007), require responses to requests to admit “by the parties and not by their attorneys.” Further, the rule requires that “the party to whom the requests to admit are directed must serve upon the requesting party either the sworn statement denying the matters of which admission is requested or written objections which need not be sworn.” Therefore, a personal injury lawyer may serve written objections on the client’s behalf.

The court acknowledged instances where an Illinois car accident lawyer may be compelled to enter an appearance despite the inability to locate a client, such as where an insurer has a duty to defend its insured under its policy. In such a case, the court’s ruling places the client (and his or her lawyer) in a difficult position when the client cannot be located. Nevertheless, the appellate court stated that “these policy issues are properly addressed to the consideration of the supreme court,” which has the authority to revise the rules.

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Fate of Illinois Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act to be Decided by Supreme Court

Monday, June 15th, 2009

illinois supreme court medical malpractice 300x222 Fate of Illinois Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act to be Decided by Supreme CourtAs discussed in a previous post, Illinois personal injury lawyers nervously await a ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court, which will decide the fate of the Malpractice Reform Act of 2005 (“Act”).  The Act caps jury awards for pain and suffering and other non-liquidated damages in medical malpractice lawsuits at $500,000 against physicians and $1 million against hospitals.

In November 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, a medical malpractice case brought by the mother of a 3-year-old child born with cerebral palsy and other severe brain damage.  As a result of medical negligence, the child will have to be fed through a tube for the rest of her life and may never live independently.  Under the damage caps required by Act, the 3-year-old child with a permanent catastrophic brain injury is limited to the same monetary damages as someone with a far less significant injury.

In Lebron, a circuit court held that the arbitrary cap on non-liquidated damages in the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 2005 was unconstitutional, and relied on an earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision in 1997, which held that caps on non-economic (i.e. “non-liquidated”) damages infringe on the jury’s role in determining appropriate compensation.  In fact, the Illinios Supreme Court has twice before struck down this type of “one size fits all” cap on non-liquidated damages as a violation of the Illinois Constitution.

Unfortunately, even if the Illinois Supreme Court decides to invalidate this Act as unconstitutional, it will eliminate other positive insurance reforms contained in the Act.  For instance, the Act forces insurancce companies to provide greater transparency on rate-setting and payouts, which results in greater compensation in the insurance industry, and lower insurance premiums for doctors.  However, the Act contains an” inseverability clause,” meaning that if one portion of the law is struck down as unconstitutional, such as the arbitrary cap on non-liquidated damages,  the  other provisions of the Act, such as the state regulators’ ability to collect and publish actuarial data used by medical malpractice insurers in Illinois, will likewise be struck down.

Nevertheless, the unfairness and negative impact of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 2005 felt by patients, such as the 3-year-old child in Lebron, requires the Illinois Supreme Court to find the Act unconstitutional, as it has done in the past.

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Chicago Construction Accident – Steel Pylon from Crane Kills Engineer

Friday, June 12th, 2009

Chicago construction crane accident1 300x225 Chicago Construction Accident   Steel Pylon from Crane Kills Engineer

According to today’s Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, the family of a 24-year-old engineering inspector settled a Chicago construction accident and wrongful death action.  The Chicago engineering inspector was killed when he was struck by a steel pylon that fell from a crane.

The 24-year-old man from Chicago was apparently working at a construction site of an Illinois Department of Transportation project on the Kingery/Borman Expressway as part of a pile driving operation at the time of the accident. A pylon broke free during the hoisting process and struck the man, causing his death.

The man’s family alleged that the subcontractor on the project was negligent in failing to clear workers from the area. Further, the family alleged that the crane operator carelessly failed to watch the load while operating the crane. The general contractor was not required to pay any of the settlement amount.

Because the accident occurred in Indiana, just across the Illinois-Indiana border, the defense argued that Indiana law should apply to the case, which would have capped damages at $300,000. Nonetheless, the parties were able to reach a fair settlement in the Chicago construction accident and wrongful death lawsuit.

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