Archive for the ‘Police Misconduct’ Category

Court Reverses $12.5 Million Verdict Based on Lawyer’s Inflammatory Comments at Trial

Wednesday, January 13th, 2010

jury trial lawyer Court Reverses $12.5 Million Verdict Based on Lawyers Inflammatory Comments at TrialA recent case decided by the Illinois appellate court stresses the importance of personal injury attorneys showing restraint in arguing a case to a jury, especially in cases where the defense has admitted fault.  In Pleasance v. City of Chicago, No. 1-08-1510 (Ill. App.  Ct 1st Dist. Dec. 14, 2009), the Illinois appellate court overturned a $12.5 million jury verdict awarded to the family of a man who was fatally shot by a Chicago police officer because of repeated improper comments by plaintiff’s counsel during the trial concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of Plaintiff’s son.

The case involved a wrongful death lawsuit against the City of Chicago and a Chicago police officer who shot and killed plaintiff’s son, Michael, on March 8, 2003.  The defendants admitted that Michael’s death was a result of the police officer “unintentionally discharging his weapon in the course of arresting someone else, constituting willful and wanton conduct” under the law as stated in Medina v. City of Chicago, 238 Ill. App. 3d 385, 392-93 (1992).

Because the defense admitted liability, the case went to trial on damages only.  In other words, the jury’s only job was to determine damages for the plaintiff’s “loss of society,” which includes “the deprivation of love, companionship, and affection from the deceased person.”  Turner v. Williams, 326 Ill. App. 3d 541, 548 (2001).

The appellate court noted that because fault was admitted, the manner in which Michael died “was wholly immaterial to the determination of loss of society.  “Defendants’ liability, willful and wanton or otherwise, was not relevant to the love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, guidance, and protection Pamela lost as a result of Michael’s death.”  Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 519 (1984).

The appellate court noted that despite the fact the circumstances underlying Michael’s death were irrelevant to the trial, which concerned only the amount of damages to plaintiff for loss of society, plaintiff’s counsel made the following improper comments during the trial:

  • During opening statements, plaintiff’s counsel stated that Michael was “gunned down by a Chicago police officer” and was shot “with an utter indifference to and conscious disregard for his safety”
  • During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel argued to the jury that its “verdict is going to tell your entire community whether you’re willing to accept a police officer’s willful and wanton killing of a member of our society” and  “there is no greater perversion in our rules of order in our society as when a police officer, who is sworn to protect us, shoots and kills an innocent member of our society”
  • During rebuttal, plaintiff’s counsel argued “It wasn’t enough for [defendants] to kill Michael Pleasance, then they had to come in here and kick dirt on his grave”

According to the court, Plaintiff’s counsel’s comments “had no place in the instant damages trial other than to inflame the passion of the jury and influence its verdict.”  The court further found that plaintiff’s counsel’s remarks “were too pervasive and insidious to have had no prejudicial effect on the jury.”  Accordingly, the court reversed the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for a new trial.

As experienced Chicago personal injury and wrongful death attorneys, we become emotionally attached to our cases and to our clients.  As the Pleasance case shows, however, especially in trials where the defense has admitted liability, plaintiff’s counsel must show some degree of emotional restraint in arguing our case to a jury.

For a Free Consultation with one of our top-rated injury attorneys, call Passen Law Group at (312) 527-4500.

share save 171 16 Court Reverses $12.5 Million Verdict Based on Lawyers Inflammatory Comments at Trial

Police Officers Not Immune in Taser Gun Injury

Saturday, August 29th, 2009

taser gun injury lawyer 300x219 Police Officers Not Immune in Taser Gun InjuryIn a case dealing with the right to file a lawsuit based on a serious injury caused by a police officer, an Illinois federal district court judge held on Wednesday that police officers who used a Taser gun on a woman are not immune from liability even though the woman was resisting arrest.  Therefore, the judge allowed the woman’s Chicago personal injury lawsuit brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, to proceed against the two officers involved.  April L. Haynes v. Village of Lansing, et al., No. 07 C 3125 (N.D. Ill. Aug 26, 2009).

The judge did not rule on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they arrested her.  However, the court noted that several pieces of evidence suggest that the woman may have been injured by police excessive force, including the use of a Taser gun on the unarmed plaintiff three times during the incident.

Still, the court held that the officers were not immune in this action.  Citing Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996), the judge stated that police officers are not immune for an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures when there is evidence that their actions were unreasonable.  Specifically, the judge held “there is a clear dispute whether any reasonable officer would believe it was necessary to deliver not one but three 50,000-volt jolts of electricity to an unarmed individual lying prone on the floor, especially considering the nonviolent nature of the crime charged (attempted obstruction of justice.”

To speak with a Chicago personal injury lawyer regarding a potential action, call Passen Law Group at (312) 527-4500 for a free consultation.

share save 171 16 Police Officers Not Immune in Taser Gun Injury

Common Fund Doctrine Applies to Medical Payments in Illinois Injury Settlement

Wednesday, June 10th, 2009

illinois common fund auto accident Common Fund Doctrine Applies to Medical Payments in Illinois Injury SettlementTo the relief of Chicago personal injury lawyers, a divided Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District recently held that the “common fund doctrine” applied reimbursement of injured plaintiff’s medical payments paid by plaintiff’s insurer.  Stevens v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 2008 WL 5473299 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Dec. 31).

The facts of the case involve Mr. Stevens, who was injured in an auto accident, and received $20,420 from his insurance company, Country Mutual Ins. Co., under the medical-payments provision of his auto policy.  Mr. Steven’s personal injury attorney negotiated a $50,000 settlement with the tortfeasor.

Mr. Stevens’ insurance policy granted Country Mutual a right of reimbursement for benefits it paid to Mr. Stevens if the insured received compensation from a third party.  Therefore, Country Mutual argued that it was entitled to a reimbursement of the full $20,420, without having to pay any discount under the “common fund doctrine.”

Conversely, plaintiff’s attorney argued that the “common fund doctrine” — under which attorneys who create a “fund” for the benefit of a third-party are entitled to be reimbursed from the fund in the form of attorney’s fees – obligated Country Mutual to pay a portion of plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.

The majority of the Illinois appellate court agreed with the plaintiff.  The majority held that if Country Mutual were to be fully reimbursed from the $50,000 settlement or “fund” created by the plaintiff’s attorney, Country Mutual would be “unjustly enriched.”

The court held that, contrary to Country Mutual’s assertions, Country Mutual benefited from the creation of the common fund (the $50,000 settlement) by plaintiff’s attorney.  The court found that but for plaintiff’s attorney’s actions, Country Mutual would have expended substantial administrative and legal resources to recover the $20,420 it paid to Mr. Stevens pursuant to its subrogation agreement.  Furthermore, the majority noted that at no time did Country Mutual state to plaintiff’s attorney that it did not want him to recover its subrogation lien and would not pay him if he did.

Accordingly, Country Mutual was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s attorney for his services in creating the common fund.  The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by Country Mutual.

Experienced Chicago car accident lawyers and attorneys practicing personal injury law in Illinois should keep in mind the “common fund doctrine” when negotiating settlements on behalf of their injured clients.

share save 171 16 Common Fund Doctrine Applies to Medical Payments in Illinois Injury Settlement