The premise behind banning texting or cell phone usage while driving is to prevent catastrophic motor vehicle accidents and wrongful death caused by distracted drivers.  On the heels of the new ban on texting while driving for truck and bus drivers, the Highway Loss Data Institute (HDLI), an affiliate of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), released a study which raises doubt on the impact of such bans.  In short, the study found no drop in traffic crashes in three states, Connecticut, New York and California, as well as the District of Columbia, after those states banned drivers from using handheld cell phones while driving.

This study seems to conflict with previous research from IIHS showing that drivers using handheld cell phones are four times more likely to be involved in serious crashes.  According to Adrian Lund, president of IIHS and HLDI, the “key finding is that crashes aren’t going down where handheld phone use has been banned.”  He posits that crash rates may not have decreased because people switched to hands-free devices after handheld phones were banned, [and]we know that people talking hands-free are really not much safer than people talking handheld.”

At best, the study demonstrates that more research is needed. It only focused on crashes reported before and after bans on the use of hand-held phones. It did not look at other factors, such as the use of Bluetooth devices. Other research has demonstrated that using Bluetooth, or other hands-free methods, does little to prevent distracted driving. A driver still has to touch a button, speak or perform other visual, manual and cognitive functions that divert concentration.

The study should not been seen as a means to stop enacting laws to prevent distracted driving, but rather as evidence that further research is necessary.  Technology has become an integral part of every day life, so it is going to be important to enact more effective laws so the roads are safer for all.

Distracted driving that contributes to or causes a serious accident may constitute negligence. If you or a loved one has been seriously injured in a car accident caused by the negligence of another, contact Passen Law Group’s Chicago car accident attorneys at  (312) 527-4500 for a Free Consultation.

The Lebron case was brought on behalf of Abigaile Lebron who allegedly sustained numerous permanent injuries during childbirth at Gottlieb, including “severe brain injury, cerebral palsy, cognitive mental impairment, inability to be fed normally such that she must be fed by a gastronomy tube, and inability to develop normal neurological functioning.”

At issue on appeal was the constitutionality of section 2-1706.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was adopted as part of Public Act 94-677, and which capped the award of noneconomic damages (including pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, loss of consortium and loss of society)  in medical malpractice actions at $500,000 for a physician and $1,000,000 for a hospital.

The Supreme Court held that the limitation on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions set forth in section 2-1706.5 of the Code violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution and is invalid.  Further, because Public Act 94-677 contained an inseverability provision, the entire Act is invalid and void in its entirety.

Our Chicago personal injury lawyers believe that all citizens of the United States have a right to a trial by a jury of their peers to decide appropriate compensation in civil actions.  For a free consultation with one of our attorneys, call Passen Law Group at (312) 527-4500.

As noted in one of our earlier blog posts, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated it would release its decision in December, but later decided not to release it on that date.

The challenged statute caps non-liquidated damages (e.g., past/current/future pain and suffering, loss of normal life, disfigurement, loss of society, etc.) in medical negligence actions at $500,000 for doctors and $1 million for hospitals.

As lawyers representing the rights of individuals and families whose lives are often destroyed by medical malpractice, we hope the Supreme Court rules that arbitrary damage caps are unconstitutional.  Indeed, at trial level in Lebron, Cook County Circuit Judge Joan Larsen held that such medical malpractice lawsuit caps are unconstitutional.

Regardless of the outcome, our Chicago personal injury lawyers will continue to fight for the rights of victims who have been permanently injured or killed as a result of the negligence of another.  Call us at (312) 527-4500 for a Free Consultation.

The United States Department of Transportation issued new federal guidelines last week, banning commercial truck and bus drivers from using hand-held cell phones or texting while driving.  The ban is the latest step towards curbing the number of people seriously injured or killed in bus or truck accidents.  Illinois, along with 18 other states and the District of Columbia, have already enacted laws banning texting while driving.

Texting or otherwise using a cell phone while driving an automobile is dangerous; doing so while behind the wheel of a semi-tracker trailer or bus, which weigh several thousand pounds and which may contain several passengers, including children, poses an even greater danger.  Semi-trucks and buses are difficult to stop or maneuver quickly, and doing so may create additional dangers, such as jack knifes or roll-overs that can lead to catastrophic injury and death.

Accidents involving semi-tracker trailers and buses can lead to debilitating injuries and even death. Such catastrophic accidents can be caused by numerous factors, such as faulty parts or driver negligence. If you or a loved one has been seriously injured in an vehicle accident, contact the experienced Chicago truck accident attorneys of Passen Law Group today at (312) 527-4500 for a Free Consultation.

Texting while driving falls under the category known as “distracted driving,” which USDOT defines as “any non-driving activity a person engages in that has the potential to distract him or her from the primary task of driving and increase the risk of crashing.”  The USDOT lists three main types of distraction:

1.    Visual (i.e., taking eyes off road)
2.    Manual (i.e., removing hands from steering wheel)
3.    Cognitive (i.e., taking your mind off driving)

Distracted driving is not limited to using cell phones, or texting while driving. Actions that seem simple, almost commonplace, like changing the radio station or taking a sip of coffee from a travel mug, are also examples of distracted driving which may contribute to a deadly car crash.

The new federal guidelines take effect immediately, and apply to trucks that weigh over 10,000 pounds and to interstate buses that carry more than eight passengers. Violators are subject to a fine up to $2,750.  For any questions, call a Chicago personal injury lawyer at Passen Law Group at (312) 527-4500.

A recent article from the Washington Independent notes the “undercurrent” of complaints made by health insurance companies, hospitals and ideological conservatives that medical malpractice claims are out of control and a leading cause of rising health care cost.  Yet, the leading economists and legal experts have found that malpractice liability costs “are a small fraction of the spiraling costs of the U.S. health care system, and that the medical errors that malpractice liability tries to prevent are themselves a huge cost — both to the injured patients and to the health care system as a whole.”

Why, then, do some politicians backed by the insurance lobby claim that medical malpractice lawsuits are out of control and are a main cause of rising health care costs?  “It’s really just a distraction,” says Tom Baker, professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and author of “The Medical Malpractice Myth.”  Professor Baker notes that  “if you were to eliminate medical malpractice liability, even forgetting the negative consequences that would have for safety, accountability, and responsiveness, maybe we’d be talking about [a savings of] 1.5 percent of health care costs.  So we’re not talking about real money.”

Another Harvard professor of Law and Public Health, Michelle Mello, agrees.  “If you were to list the top five or ten things that you could do to bring down health care costs, [tort reform] would not be on the list.”

Our Chicago personal injury lawyers are proud to represent individuals and families whose lives have been forever impacted by the negligence or recklessness of others.  Call (312) 527-4500 for a Free Consultation with one of our attorneys.

Governor Quinn attributes this downward trend to a number of factors, including the increase in seat belt usage, and the public safety initiatives of the Illinois Department of Transportation, Illinois State Police and local law enforcement.  Specifically, law enforcement has targeted the “Fatal Five” traffic violations, which cause many deadly car and truck accidents: (1) speeding; (2) safety belts; (3) improper lane usage; (4) following too closely; and (5) driving under the influence.

Further, as other blog posts from our Chicago personal injury lawyers have noted, this year two new laws take effect to combat “texting while driving.”  Specifically, the laws:

• Prohibit drivers under the age of 19 from using a cell phone while driving.  The law also prohibits drivers of all ages from using a cell phone while driving in a school zone or construction zone.
• Prohibits sending, typing or reading text messages, or surfing the internet while driving.

For a Free Consultation with one of our Chicago car accident attorneys, call Passen Law Group at (312) 527-4500.

Consider the following situation:  The plaintiff is involved in a car accident caused by the defendant, who was driving his mother’s car at the time of the accident.  The plaintiff files a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant within the appropriate statute of limitations period (2 years from the date of the accident).  During discovery, the plaintiff learns that the defendant was driving the vehicle within the scope of his employment as a salesman for X Corporation.  Plaintiff amends her complaint to add X Corporation as an additional defendant — however, by this time, the statute of limitations has expired.

The question becomes:  Does plaintiff’s amended complaint “relate back” to the original lawsuit so as to avoid being dismissed based on statute of limitations grounds?  In Wilson v. Molda, No. 1-09-0386 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009), the Illinois appellate court answered “no”.

The facts in Wilson were identical to the fact-pattern described above.  In response to motions to dismiss brought by the defendant’s employer, Metrolift Inc., based on statute of limitations grounds, the plaintiff’s lawyer made two arguments: (1) plaintiff’s lawsuit against the original defendant should satisfy the statute of limitations based on the “respondeat superior” relationship between the defendant and his employer; and (2) the amended complaint should “relate back” to the original complaint based on section 2-616(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.  The court rejected both of plaintiff’s arguments.

First, the court found no basis in any Illinois statute or any Illinois case law to support the contention that because the employer was jointly and severally liable for the employee’s conduct under the theory of respondeat superior, the timely filing of a lawsuit against the employee preserves the plaintiff’s claim against the employer.  The court “decline[d] the plaintiff’s invitation to rewrite the existing statute of limitations, as we believe that is the job of the legislature.”

Second, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim against Metrolift does not “relate back” to the original complaint under section 2-616 (b) of the Code.  The court found that section (b) permits a plaintiff, under certain circumstances, to add claims to an existing action.  By its own terms, subsection (b) applies only to the addition of “causes of action, cross claims or defenses.”  Here, plaintiff was not seeking to add a new claim, but instead was seeking to add a new party to an existing action.

Instead, the court found that subsection (d) of section 2-626 deals with adding new parties, but only in cases of “mistaken identity.”  The plaintiff admitted that this is not a case of mistaken identity, and therefore subsection (d) did not apply.  Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s action against the defendant’s employer based on the statute of limitations.

For a Free Consultation with one of or top-rated Chicago injury and wrongful death lawyers, call Passen Law Group at (312) 527-4500.

In Chicago, the city enacted section 10-8-180 of the Chicago Municipal Code, which states that, in general, “every owner, lessee, tenant, occupant or other person having charge of any building or lot of ground in the city abutting upon any public way or public place shall remove the snow and ice from the sidewalk in front of such building or lot of ground.” In other words, people are generally charged with the responsibility to shovel and remove ice or snow from the section of sidewalk in front of their home or business.

However, the questions posed to our Chicago premises liability attorneys becomes  (1) what are the repercussions for failing to remove ice/snow; and, (2) what are the repercussions for removing ice/snow in a negligent manner?  The ordinance appears to address only the first question.

Section 10-8-190 states that “any person, who removes snow or ice from the public sidewalk or street, shall not, as a result of his acts or omissions in such removal, be liable for civil damages.” In other words, the Chicago ordinance suggests that a business or property owner may be considered negligent for failing to shovel, salt or remove ice from the sidewalk, but not for removing snow/ice in a careless manner.

More generally, Illinois follows the “natural accumulation” rule (codified in the Snow and Ice Removal Act, 745 ILCS 75/2 (2006)) for slip and fall accidents, which states that a property owner has no duty to remove a natural accumulation of snow or ice from property.  However, a property owner may be held liable for a “voluntarily undertaking” to remove ice and snow, and doing so in a negligent manner.  Or, a property owner may also be held liable for slips and falls on an “unnatural accumulation” of ice or snow (often caused by the negligent snow/ice removal).  or slip an unnatural accumulation of snow or ice or aggravates a natural condition.

Public entities are also generally subject to the natural accumulation rule under the Governmental Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/3-102 -105(a) (2008), which provides that  public entities owe a duty of ordinary care in the maintenance of its property, but is not liable “for an injury caused by the effect of weather” on public property.
It is oftentimes difficult to determine whether a person slipped and fell on a “natural” or “unnatural” accumulation of ice and snow, as noted by various Illinois courts.  Because of the general duty of landowners to maintain their property in a reasonably safe manner, Illinois courts oftentimes deny summary judgment to defendants on this basis, and allow a jury to decide the issue of natural or unnatural accumulation of ice or snow.

There are various other issues that are important to flesh out in slip and fall or other premises liability cases, including “notice” of the dangerous condition, including the length of time the dangerous condition existed and prior complaints to the defendant property owners.

If you have been seriously and permanently injured in a slip & fall or other accident that you believe was caused by the carelessness or recklessness of another individual or entity, call (312) 527-4500 for a Free Consultation with one of Passen Law Group’s top-rated Chicago injury attorneys.

The studies focused on a particular bacteria, Staphylococcus aureus — or staph, which is a leading cause of hospital infections.  The first study showed that approximately one-third of all hospital patients carry this bacteria — in their noses and on their skin — when they arrive at the hospital.   Such bacteria is harmless, but presents a risk if there is any cut or breach to the skin.  More than 300,000 of those patients end up with infections after undergoing surgery each year.  The study demonstrates that showering those patients with soap treated with antiseptic chlorhexidine and rubbing their noses with antibiotic nasal ointment reduces surgery-related infections by 60 percent.

The second study compared surgery patients cleaned, pre-surgery, in the area on the patient’s body where surgery will be performed with chlorhexidine and with iodine. The studies showed that patients cleaned with chlorhexidine-alcohol, rather than povidone-iodine, developed 40 percent fewer infections.  Yet, hospitals continue to use iodine in 75 percent of procedures.

All surgical procedures carry a risk of infection.  However, the studies discussed above show that many hospital-acquired infections are preventable with simple preventative care.  There are also various other types of life-threatening infections that may be caused by a failure to follow the appropriate standard of medical care.  In such instances of suspected medical negligence resulting in serious permanent injury or death, it is critical to contact an experienced Chicago medical malpractice attorney to investigate your case before the statute of limitations has expired.

For a Free Consultation with one of our personal injury and wrongful death attorneys, call Passen Law Group today at (312) 527-4500.

In Weisberg, the plaintiff was employed by Chicago Acceleration and was assigned to provide athletic training services to the Chicago Steel, an amateur (“Junior A”) hockey team in the United States Hockey League (USHL).  Plaintiff’s duties included refilling water bottles for the Chicago Steel players during practice.  The players would notify plaintiff that the water bottles needed to be refilled by banging a hockey stick on the locker room door, and plaintiff would then go fill up the bottles at the players’ bench area next to the ice rink.

During a practice in 2004, the plaintiff was in the trainer’s room working on paperwork when he heard a player banging a stick on the locker room door.  As plaintiff walked to the bench area to refill the water bottles, he was struck in the right eye by a hockey puck, which was shot by one of the Chicago Steel players.  Plaintiff fractured his skull and sustained retinal tearing, which resulted in permanent vision loss.

Plaintiff filed a personal injury law complaint against the player who shot the puck and the Chicago Steel alleging negligence and willful and wanton conduct.  The complaint alleged that the player was negligent by deliberately “sniping” or shooting pucks at water bottles on the bench, as plaintiff entered the bench area to refill the bottles.  Plaintiff also alleged that the Chicago Steel committed negligence by failing to prevent players from shooting pucks toward the bench area.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the negligence claims under the “contact sports exception,” a judicially created exception to ordinary negligence claims, which provides that “voluntary participants in a contact sport may be held liable for injuries to co-participants caused by willful and wanton or intentional conduct, but not for injuries caused by ordinary negligence.”  Azzano v. Catholic Bishop, 304 Ill. App. 3d 713, 716 (1999).  The purpose of the contact sports exception is to ensure that the law did not place unreasonable burdens on the “free and vigorous participation in sports by our youth,” and therefore the exception was “carefully drawn” to control a new field of personal injury litigation.  Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 215 (1975).

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the contact sports exception was not applicable because the plaintiff was not a participant in the contact sport (hockey), but rather, an athletic trainer providing training services.  Alternatively, her argued that even if he was a participant, the contact sports exception did not apply because “sniping” involves conduct “totally outside the range of ordinary activities associated with ice hockey.” The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff, and reversed the trial court’s dismissal order.

The appellate court held that permitting plaintiff to maintain a cause of action against the defendants based on ordinary negligence “would not violate the spirit and purpose of the contact sports exception” for three reasons:  (1) the circumstances of plaintiff’s injury; (2) the relationship of the parties to each other and the sport of hockey; and (3) such a result would not harm the sport of hockey or cause it to be changed.

With respect to the circumstances of plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff was not a player in the sport of hockey nor otherwise affiliated with the  Chicago Steel at the time of the injury.  Rather, the court found that he was a “trainer employed by an independent company providing training services to the Chicago Steel and was only in the vicinity of the hockey rink during practice to replace water bottles.”  Therefore, he was not a voluntary participant in the physical conduct inherent in the sport of ice hockey.  The court also found that the plaintiff had an “attenuated” relationship with the defendants and with the sport of hockey.

Finally, the court found that allowing the defendants to be held liable for negligence in this case would not have a “chilling” effect on vigorous participation in the sport of hockey.  According to the court, “unlike body checking, shooting pucks at water bottles located in the bench area, as opposed to shooting pucks at a goal or at other targets within the rink, is not an inherent part of the sport of hockey” and will not change the game of hockey as we commonly know it to be played.

In sum, the appellate court delivered a very well-reasoned and thoughtful opinion.  I must say I support the decision, both in my capacity as a personal injury lawyer and as a hockey player.  The type of “sniping” games depicted in this case are common place in hockey rinks across the country, but they are really unnecessary to the sport and, as this case proves, potentially very dangerous.  Coaches and hockey organizations will have to crack down on these types of activities that pose a threat to people outside the game of hockey.

For a Free Consultation with one of Passen Law Group’s top-rated Chicago personal injury attorneys and wrongful death lawyers, call us at (312) 527-4500.

The case involved a wrongful death lawsuit against the City of Chicago and a Chicago police officer who shot and killed plaintiff’s son, Michael, on March 8, 2003.  The defendants admitted that Michael’s death was a result of the police officer “unintentionally discharging his weapon in the course of arresting someone else, constituting willful and wanton conduct” under the law as stated in Medina v. City of Chicago, 238 Ill. App. 3d 385, 392-93 (1992).

Because the defense admitted liability, the case went to trial on damages only.  In other words, the jury’s only job was to determine damages for the plaintiff’s “loss of society,” which includes “the deprivation of love, companionship, and affection from the deceased person.”  Turner v. Williams, 326 Ill. App. 3d 541, 548 (2001).

The appellate court noted that because fault was admitted, the manner in which Michael died “was wholly immaterial to the determination of loss of society.  “Defendants’ liability, willful and wanton or otherwise, was not relevant to the love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, guidance, and protection Pamela lost as a result of Michael’s death.”  Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 519 (1984).

The appellate court noted that despite the fact the circumstances underlying Michael’s death were irrelevant to the trial, which concerned only the amount of damages to plaintiff for loss of society, plaintiff’s counsel made the following improper comments during the trial:

• During opening statements, plaintiff’s counsel stated that Michael was “gunned down by a Chicago police officer” and was shot “with an utter indifference to and conscious disregard for his safety”
• During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel argued to the jury that its “verdict is going to tell your entire community whether you’re willing to accept a police officer’s willful and wanton killing of a member of our society” and  “there is no greater perversion in our rules of order in our society as when a police officer, who is sworn to protect us, shoots and kills an innocent member of our society”
• During rebuttal, plaintiff’s counsel argued “It wasn’t enough for [defendants] to kill Michael Pleasance, then they had to come in here and kick dirt on his grave”

According to the court, Plaintiff’s counsel’s comments “had no place in the instant damages trial other than to inflame the passion of the jury and influence its verdict.”  The court further found that plaintiff’s counsel’s remarks “were too pervasive and insidious to have had no prejudicial effect on the jury.”  Accordingly, the court reversed the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for a new trial.

As experienced Chicago personal injury and wrongful death attorneys, we become emotionally attached to our cases and to our clients.  As the Pleasance case shows, however, especially in trials where the defense has admitted liability, plaintiff’s counsel must show some degree of emotional restraint in arguing our case to a jury.

For a Free Consultation with one of our top-rated injury attorneys, call Passen Law Group at (312) 527-4500.

In Aurora, Peter Morano was severely injured when a large block of ice came off the top of a semi-tracker trailer as it was passing beneath an overpass.  According to news reports, the block of ice hit and shattered the windshield.  The driver’s nose was broken in several places, and the orbital bone of his left eye shattered.  Lacerations to his left iris may leave his vision permanently damaged.

While there is no data specifically related to how many serious motor vehicle accidents each winter are  specifically caused by ice falling off large trucks and other vehicles, there is plenty of data showing a spike in catastrophic car and truck accidents during the winter months due to weather-related factors.  f you have been seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident that you suspect was caused by the negligence or recklessness of another, contact an experienced car accident lawyer at Passen Law Group.

The accident described above raises a number of questions that have no simple answer.  For example, should the law require truckers to remove snow and ice from their vehicles prior to hitting the road?  The obvious answer is yes and, indeed, New Jersey passed such a law in October 2009.  To date, New Jersey is the only state to have passed such a law.

One problem is that such laws may run counter to current federal motor carrier safety regulations that prohibit drivers from climbing atop their rigs without proper safety equipment.  Such equipment is often only available at the terminal, if at all, and is impossible for truckers to bring with them on the road.

It stands to reason that if de-icing equipment exists for 747s, then snow and ice removal equipment exists for semi-tracker trailers.  Unlike the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which requires de-icing of aircraft, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCA) does not require snow and ice to be removed from semis.  Thus, it is of little surprise that a survey conducted by the American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI) shows 54% of truckers “rarely or never” remove snow and ice from their rigs.

For now, New Jersey may stand as an example enacting, supporting and enforcing snow and ice removal laws in order to make roads safer for all.  Hopefully, for the sake of public safety on our nation’s roadways, other states, including Illinois, will follow.

If you have been seriously injured in a crash involving a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or other motor vehicle, contact Passen Law Group for Free Consultation with a Chicago personal injury lawyer at (312) 527-4500.